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Dead Man Walking: An Empirical Reassessment of the Deterrent Effect of 
Capital Punishment Using the Bounds Testing Approach to Cointegration 
 
Abstract 
This paper empirically estimates a murder supply equation for the United States from 
1965 to 2001 within a cointegration and error correction framework. Our findings 
suggest that any support for the deterrence hypothesis is sensitive to the inclusion of 
variables for the effect of guns and other crimes. In the long-run we find that real 
income and the conditional probability of receiving the death sentence are the main 
factors explaining variations in the homicide rate.  In the short-run the aggravated 
assault rate and robbery rate are the most important determinants of the homicide rate. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since Ehrlich’s (1975) seminal research, several studies have examined the deterrent 
effect of capital punishment within an economic framework.  Ehrlich’s (1975) finding 
that each execution in the United States between 1935 and 1969 deterred seven or 
eight murders immediately evoked a flurry of critical comment focusing primarily on 
the econometric aspects of the study (see eg Baldus and Cole 1975, Bowers and 
Pierce 1975, Passell and Taylor 1977, Blumstein et al 1978).  These criticisms were 
met with a series of spirited defences (see eg Ehrlich 1975a, Ehrlich 1977, Ehrlich and 
Gibbons 1977, Ehrlich and Randall 1977).  However, subsequent studies using data 
for the United States have reached mixed conclusions on the deterrent effect.  
 
Some studies have found evidence that capital punishment exhibits a deterrent effect 
(see eg Ehrlich 1977a, Chressanthis 1989, Layson 1985, Brumm and Cloninger, 1996, 
Ehrlich and Liu 1999, Lott and Landes 2000, Cloninger and Marchesini, 2001 
Dezhbakhsh  et al. 2003, Mocan and Gittings, 2003, Zimmerman, 2004, 2004a, 
Shepherd 2004, Liu 2004 Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd, 2004).  In one recent study 
Dezhbakhsh et al. (2003) concluded that, on average, the execution of each offender 
saves the lives of 18 potential victims.  There are other studies, though, that have 
found no evidence to support the view that capital punishment has a deterrent effect or 
have found that the deterrent effect is sensitive to the choice of empirical specification 
(see eg Forst 1977, Cover and Thistle 1988, Grogger 1990, Yunker 2001, Katz et al 
2003).  Katz et al (2003) find that poor conditions in prison have a strong deterrent 
effect, but find that the deterrent effect of capital punishment is sensitive to the choice 
of specification and takes on a positive sign as frequently as a negative sign. 
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This paper tests the deterrent effect of capital punishment in the United States using 
the bounds testing procedure to cointegration, within an autoregressive distributive lag 
(ARDL) framework, developed by Pesaran and others (Pesaran and Pesaran 1997, 
Pesaran and Shin 1999, Pesaran et al 2001).  The study employs aggregate time series 
data for the period 1965 to 2001. The contribution of this study to the existing 
literature on the economics of capital punishment is to employ the cointegration and 
error correction framework, which has not been used in the capital punishment 
literature before.  The cointegration framework has the advantage that we can estimate 
the short-run and long-run elasticities for the murder supply equation.  
 
The results of most existing time series studies on this topic are potentially spurious 
because they do not take account of the stationarity properties of the data.  This is true 
inter alia of Ehrlich (1975), Passell and Taylor (1977), Layson (1985) and Yunker 
(2001), as well as Wolpin’s (1978) study for the United Kingdom and the Avio (1979) 
and Layson (1983) studies for Canada.  Cover and Thistle (1988) explicitly test for 
unit roots and find that the homicide rate is non-stationary.  They address this issue 
through estimating the murder supply function in first differences.  The problem with 
differencing, however, is that it eliminates the trend component.  Hence, this approach 
can only allow examination of the short-term, not long-run, trends in the time series.  
 
The bounds testing approach to cointegration has three major advantages. The first is 
that it can be applied irrespective of whether the underlying regressors are purely 
() 0 I , purely   or mutually cointegrated. We tested the stationarity of the variables  () 1 I
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the small sample unit root tests proposed 
by Elliot et al (1996). To save space the results are not reported, but they suggest that   5
two of the key variables, the robbery and unemployment rates, are  , while the  () 0 I
other variables are  . () 1 I
1 Using the bounds test is appropriate under these 
circumstances. The second advantage of using the bounds testing approach to 
cointegration is that Monte Carlo studies suggest that it performs better than the Engle 
and Granger (1987), Johansen and Juselieus (1990) and Phillips and Hansen (1990) 
cointegration test in small samples (see eg. Pesaran and Shin 1999, Haug 2002).  
 
For this reason the bounds test is becoming a popular method to test for cointegration 
and there are now several published studies which employ it. However, most previous 
studies which have employed the bounds testing approach have used the critical 
bounds reported in Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) which are calculated for a sample size 
of 500 based on 20,000 replications of a stochastic stimulation or Pesaran et al (2001), 
which are calculated for a sample size of 1000 based on 40,000 replications of a 
stochastic stimulation.  With small samples such as these and those employed in the 
current study the critical value bounds can deviate substantially from those reported in 
Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran et al (2001).  To address this issue, in this 
paper we calculate the exact critical value bounds tailored to our sample size. 
 
A third advantage of using the bounds testing approach to cointegration within the 
ARDL framework is that it addresses the potential endogeneity problem of the law 
enforcement variables in the murder supply equation.  Most previous estimates of the 
United States homicide function have used two stages least squares (see eg Ehrlich 
1975, Hoenack and Weiler 1980).  Layson (1985) argues that because the United 
States has a uniform crime code and law enforcement authority, it is less likely that 
law enforcement behavior will be endogenous compared with Canada and thus the 
econometric justification for using two stage least squares is weak.  Layson (1985)   6
performs a Hausman test and is unable to reject the null hypothesis that the criminal 
justice variables are exogenous.  The Hausman test is inapplicable within the ARDL 
framework.  However, Pesaran and Shin (1999, p. 16) contend that “appropriate 
modification of the orders of the ARDL model is sufficient to simultaneously correct 
for residual serial correlation and the problem of endogenous regressors”. 
 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows.  The next section sets out the generic 
murder supply equation to be tested and discusses the expected signs on the variables. 
Section III outlines the econometric methodology in more detail.  The results are 
presented in section IV for various specifications.  Foreshadowing the main findings, 
there is at best mixed support for the deterrence hypothesis and what support exists is 
sensitive to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables.  In the long-run real 
income and the conditional probability of receiving the death sentence are the main 
factors explaining variations in the homicide rate.  In the short-run the aggravated 
assault rate and robbery rate are the most important determinants of variations in the 
homicide rate across all empirical specifications.  Section V reports tests for the 
stability of the coefficients and the final section contains some concluding comments. 
 
II. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) develop a supply of offences function where the 
rational individual will allocate his/her time between legitimate and illegitimate 
earning activities so as to maximize utility.  Ehrlich (1975) extends the supply of 
offences function to murder, which he argues are a by-product of hate, jealousy or 
other interpersonal conflict involving pecuniary or non-pecuniary motives or are a by-
product of other crimes.  According to the economic model of crime, potential 
offenders will change their behavior at the margin in response to an increase or   7
decrease in the incentives to engage in legitimate or illegitimate earning opportunities.  
The generic empirical specification employed in this study is a variant of the Ehrlich 
(1975) murder supply equation, where the murder rate is specified as a function of 
criminal justice variables, economic variables and demographic variables. 
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Each of the variables in Equation (1) are as defined in table 1 and the sources for each 
of the variables are described in appendix 1. We begin with the dependent variable, 
which is the log of the number of murders and non-negligent manslaughters per 
100,000 population. Glaser (1977) claims that homicides carried out in the heat of the 
moment are “crimes of passion”, which are nondeterrable and should be subtracted 
out.  However, Dezhbakhsh et al (2003, pp. 355-356) show that any inference about 
the deterrent effect is unaffected by the inclusion of nondeterrable murders in the 
murder rate. The explanatory variables are discussed in more detail below.  
---------------------- 
Insert Table 1 
------------------ 
We use a log linear specification.  Bowers and Pierce (1975), Passell and Taylor 
(1977) and Klein et al (1978) suggest that Ehrlich’s (1975) findings with a log linear 
specification are sensitive to functional form.  However, Ehrlich (1977a) and Layson 
(1983, 1985) argue on theoretical and empirical grounds that the log linear form is 
superior to the linear form.
2  Both Cameron (1994) and Ehrlich (1996) suggest that a 
log-linear form is more likely to find evidence of a deterrent effect than a linear form.  
This makes our results more favourable to the deterrence hypothesis.    8
 
Criminal Justice Variables 
There are three criminal justice variables. ln  is the log of the arrest clearance rate; 
lnPS is the log of the probability of receiving the death sentence conditional on being 
apprehended and 
PA
PE ln  is the log of the probability of execution, conditional on 
being sentenced to death. We use sentencing data because the Bureau of Justice 
statistics no longer collects information on convictions for murder.  Cameron (1994, 
p. 210) suggests that death sentencing should be used more in deterrence studies and 
Dezhbakhsh et al (2003), who also use the conditional probability of being sentenced 
to death, argue that sentencing data is a viable alternative to using data on convictions.  
 
The economic model suggests that the probability of apprehension, conditional 
probability of receiving the death sentence and the conditional probability of 
execution should have a negative effect on the murder rate.  Moreover, the economic 
model suggests a ranking of the magnitude of the coefficients corresponding to the 
range of possible harms that result from a given risk. The absolute value of the 
coefficient on the probability of apprehension should be greater than the absolute 
value of the coefficient on the conditional probability of receiving the death sentence. 
This, in turn should be greater than the absolute value on the coefficient of the 
conditional probability of being executed (Ehrlich 1975, Ehrlich 1982).   
 
For probability of sentencing given arrest we use a two-year lag displacement, which 
follows the approach in Dezhbakhsh et al (2003).  Thus the conditional sentencing 
probability is the number of death sentences at t divided by the number of arrests for 
murder at t-2.  For the probability of execution given the death sentence we use two   9
different lag displacements which reflect the average length of time spent on death 
row before execution for the pre-moratorium and post-moratorium periods.  Prior to 
the moratorium the average length of time from being sentenced to death to being 
executed was three years.  After the moratorium the average length of time from being 
sentenced to death to being executed has been nine years (United States Department 
of Justice, various).  Thus, for the period 1965 to 1976, the conditional probability of 
execution is measured as the number of executions in period t divided by the number 
of death sentences in t-3.  For the period 1977 to 2001, the conditional probability of 
execution is measured as the number of executions in period t divided by the number 
of death sentences in t-9.   Because we use a log specification, in order to avoid the 
zeros problem we use two alternative approaches.  First, we follow Ehrlich (1975) and 
Wolpin (1978) and arbitrarily assume that there was one execution in those years 
where there were no executions.  Second, we follow Layson (1983, 1985) and use a 
Bayesian approach for determining the conditional probability of execution from 1968 
to 1976 which allows potential criminals to revise their subjective probabilities of 
being executed in light of new information (see Layson 1985, p. 74 for details). 
 
As a check on the robustness of our findings we also reran the regressions using an 
averaging rule to measure the sentencing and execution variables (see Layson 1985). 
In these regressions we employed a two-year moving average to measure the 
conditional sentencing variable.  To measure the conditional probability of execution 
given the death sentence for 1965 to 1976 we used a three-year moving average and 
for 1977 to 2001 we used a nine-year moving average. The results in each case were 
the same as those reported in terms of the sign and significance of the variables. 
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Economic variables:  
The model contains three economic variables, which measure the returns to legitimate 
and illegitimate earning activities.  These are  Y ln , which is the log of real per capita 
personal disposable income;  U ln , which is the log of the unemployment rate, and 
L ln , which is the log of the labor force participation rate.  These variables are 
included for two reasons.  First, as Ehrlich (1975) stresses, some murders are 
committed as a byproduct of property crime.  Thus, variables which influence 
property crime may also influence the murder rate.  Second, income variables may 
directly affect the demand for malevolent action (Ehrlich 1975, p. 402).  The 
unemployment rate is expected to have a positive sign and the labor force 
participation rate is expected to have a negative sign.  The sign on real income is 
ambiguous.  To the extent that real income reflects the opportunity cost of committing 
crime we expect it to have a negative sign, but if it is measuring changes in the level 
of “plunderable wealth” or “victim stock”, the expected sign will be positive. 
 
Demographic variables:  
AGE ln  is the log of the percentage of the resident population aged between 18-24. 
This is included to control for the differential treatment of young offenders under the 
law (Ehrlich 1975, p. 402). Ehrlich (1975) uses the percentage of resident population 
aged between 14-24, but Passell and Taylor (1977) argue this is too broad and use the 
18-24 year old age group instead.  The expected sign is positive.  ln  is the log of 
the percentage of resident population that is non-white. The incarceration rate for 
African-American males is much higher than that for white males. This has been 
explained in terms of African Americans having more limited labor market 
opportunities (Freeman 1996).   Thus, the non-white variable is included on the 
grounds that legitimate earning opportunities for non-whites, and in particular African 
NW  11
American males, is not as good as whites. The expected sign is positive.    is the 
log of the divorce rate.  Ehrlich (1975) was criticized for not taking account of the 
decline in family values on the level of property crime and because homicide is 
viewed as a by-product of property crime, by extension the homicide rate.  Later 
studies such as Layson (1985) and Cover and Thistle (1988) address this issue through 
using variables such as the proportion of families where both husband and wife are 
present.  The expected sign on the divorce rate is positive. 
D ln
 
FA ln  is the log of the proportion of fatalities, which involve firearms.  Klein et al 
(1978) and Kleck (1979) criticize Ehrlich (1975) for not including a gun variable.  
Kleck (1979) found that when a gun variable is included the conditional probability of 
execution becomes statistically insignificant.   The effect of gun ownership on crime 
rates is controversial.  Cook et al (1995) and Kellerman et al (1995) suggest that an 
increase in gun ownership results in higher crime rates.  Lott and Mustard (1997) find 
that the passage of concealed handgun laws by a state results in a substantial reduction 
in the number of property and violent crimes.  This result is attributed to a deterrent 
effect where, as criminals become more aware that victims might be armed, they 
commit less crime. Dezhbakhsh and Rubin (1998) use Lott and Mustard’s (1997) data 
set and correct for econometric problems in the original study. Dezhbakhsh and Rubin 
(1998) find that the effect of the passage of concealed handgun laws on crime rates is 
ambiguous with some crimes increasing and others decreasing.  
 
Dezhbakhsh et al (2003) use National Rifle Association (NRA) membership to proxy 
the effect of gun ownership on crime rates. NRA membership might be a good proxy 
to capture victims’ error. However, a potential problem with using NRA membership   12
is that much violent crime is committed with illegally owned guns, in particular 
among those involved with the drug trade and/or involved in street gang activities 
(Blumstein 1995, Donohoe and Levitt 1998).  Therefore, we believe that the 
proportion of fatalities which involve firearms is a better proxy than NRA 
membership to take account of the effect of gun ownership on the murder rate. 
 
Other Crimes 
Murder is often the byproduct of violent crime. For example, Zimring (1977) has 
shown that increasing proportions of homicides are the outcome of robbery.  Ehrlich 
(1975) does not include violent crime as a potential explanatory variable, but Klein et 
al (1978) and McKee and Sesnowitz (1977) find that the conditional probability of 
execution becomes statistically insignificant when other crimes are added to the 
murder supply equation.  This is attributed to a shift in the propensity to commit crime 
which shifts the supply function.  In contrast, Dezhbakhsh et al (2003) find that all of 
the deterrence variables continue to be statistically significant with the expected sign 
when violent crimes are added to the murder supply equation.  Following Dezhbakhsh 
et al (2003) we include two violent crimes in the murder supply function.  These are 
AA ln , the log of the aggravated assault rate, and  R ln , the log of the robbery rate. 
 
III. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
The bounds testing procedure to cointegration is developed within an autoregressive 
distributed lag framework and can be carried out in two stages. In the first stage, the 
existence of a long-run relationship among the variables predicted by theory is tested. 
With prior information about the expected direction of the long-run relationship 
among the variables, we treat the murder rate as the dependent variable. Here we   13
present a brief outline of the procedure involved.  Let us define a vector of variables 
 where  ,   is the dependent variable and   is a vector of 
regressors.  The data generating process of   is a p-order vector autoregression.  For 
cointegration analysis it is essential that 
t z () ′ ′ = t t t x , y z t y t x
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Here,  yy π  and  yx π  are long-run multipliers.  0 β  is the drift and  is a vector of 
exogenous components e.g. dummy variables. Lagged values of 
t w
t y ∆  and current and 
lagged values of  t x ∆  model the short-run dynamic structure. The bounds testing 
procedure tests for the absence of any level relationship between   and   through 
exclusion of the lagged levels variables   and   in equation (2). It follows then 
that our test for the absence of a conditional level relationship between   and   
have the following null and alternative hypotheses: 
t y t x
t y
1 − t y 1 − t x
t x
, : H yy 0 0 = π   , x . yx 0′ = π             () 3
, : H yy 0 1 ≠ π   0′ ≠ x . yx π  or  , yy 0 ≠ π   0′ = x . yx π  or  , yy 0 = π   . x . yx 0′ ≠ π               () 4
 
These hypotheses can be examined using the standard F statistic. The F test has a 
non-standard distribution which depends upon: (i) whether variables included in the 
ARDL model are   or  , (ii) the number of regressors and (iii) whether the  () 1 I () 0 I
ARDL model contains an intercept and/or a trend.  Pesaran et al (2001) report two 
sets of critical values based on 40,000 replications of a stochastic stimulation, which 
provide critical value bounds for all classifications of the regressors into purely  ,  () 1 I
purely   or mutually cointegrated for a sample size of 1000 observations.   () 0 I  14
 
However, in this study, we have a relatively small sample size of 37 observations.  
With small sample sizes the relevant critical values potentially deviate substantially 
from the critical values reported in Pesaran et al (2001). Therefore, we calculate exact 
critical value bounds tailored to our sample size. We calculate exact critical value 
bounds using stochastic simulations for  37 = T with eight or nine regressors, based 
on 40,000 replications for the F-statistic.  We employ a model with an intercept, but 
no trend, which is case II in Pesaran et al’s (2001) terminology (see Pesaran et al 
2001 for details).  If the computed F statistics falls outside the critical bounds, a 
conclusive decision can be made regarding cointegration without knowing the order 
of integration of the regressors.  If the estimated F  statistic is higher than the upper 
bound of the critical values then the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. If 
the estimated F statistic is lower than the lower bound of critical values, the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. Assuming that a long-run 
relationship is ascertained in stage one, stage two involves the estimation of the 
parameters of the long-run relationship and the associated short-run dynamic error 
correction models (ECM). First the orders of the lags in the ARDL model are selected 
using a lag selection criterion such as the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and in 
the second step the selected model is estimated by ordinary least squares. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
In the first step of the ARDL analysis we tested for the presence of long-run 
relationships using four variations of equation (1).  In models (1)-(4) we arbitrarily 
assume that there was one execution per year between 1968 and 1976 and in models 
(5)-(8) we rerun the same regressions using the Bayesian probabilities of execution 
between 1968 and 1976.  As we use annual data, the maximum number of lags in the   15
ARDL was set equal to 2. The calculated F-statistics for models (1)-(4) are reported in 
Table 2 and the calculated F-statistics for models (5)-(8) are reported in Table 3.  
 
() . FM  is higher than the upper bound critical value in each case, with the exception of 
model (1), where the calculated F statistic of 3.062 is slightly less than the upper 
bound critical value of 3.317 at the 10 per cent level. However, given that the 
unemployment variable is an  ( ) 0 I  process, it is likely that there is a cointegration 
relationship among the variables in model (1), so we proceed on this basis.  In models 
(2), (3), (4), (6), (7) and (8) the calculated F-statistics are greater than the upper bound 
critical value at 5 per cent.  In model (5) the calculated F statistic is greater than the 
upper bound critical value at 1 per cent. Thus, we conclude that there is a long-run 
cointegrating relationship amongst the variables in each model.  
------------------------ 
Insert Tables 2 & 3 
------------------------ 
Once we established that a long-run cointegration relationship existed, model (1) was 
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   (5) 
Similar ARDL specifications were estimated for models (2)-(8). In estimating the 
ARDL specifications a maximum of 2 lags was used (imax=2). The estimated models 
are based on minimizing the SBC.  The long-run results for models (1) to (4) are 
reported in table 2 and the long-run results for models (5) to (8) are reported in table   16
3.  The short-run results for models (1) to (4) are reported in table 4 and the short-run 
results for models (5) to (8) are reported in table 5, in each case together with 
diagnostic tests. The error correction term in the short-run models is statistically 
significant at 1 per cent with a negative sign in models (2)-(4) and (6)-(8), at 5 per 
cent in model (5) and at the 20 per cent level for model (1). This confirms that a long-
run equilibrium relationship exists between the variables. Apart from the RESET test 
in model (7), all the short-run models pass the diagnostic tests for autocorrelation, 
functional form and heteroskedasticity and the fit of the models is good. 
----------------------- 




The results provide at best mixed support for the deterrence hypothesis.  In the long-
run the three criminal justice variables have the expected sign in most cases, but are 
generally not statistically significant. The conditional probability of receiving the 
death sentence is statistically significant in models (2) to (4) and (6) to (8); however 
the probability of apprehension is only statistically significant in models (3) and (7) 
and the conditional probability of execution is statistically insignificant in all models.  
The ranking property of the magnitude of the coefficients which Ehrlich (1982, p. 9) 
describes as “a key theoretical proposition” does not hold in most models.
3   
 
In the short-run the probability of apprehension is statistically significant with the 
expected sign in model (1), but is statistically insignificant in the other models. In the 
short-run in model (7) the conditional probability of apprehension with a one period 
lag is statistically significant with a positive sign. One reason for this result might be a 
moral hazard problem where potential victims of crime react to an increase in public 
sector deterrence in period t-1, through spending less on private sector deterrence,   17
such as home security, in period t (see Cameron 1988).  The conditional probability of 
being sentenced to death is statistically insignificant in model (1), but is statistically 
significant with the expected sign in models (2) to (8).  The conditional probability of 
execution is statistically significant with the expected sign in model (1). However, 
consistent with studies such as Klein et al (1978), McKee and Sesnowitz (1977) and 
Kleck (1979) it becomes statistically insignificant in models (2)- (4) when other 
crimes and/or the firearm proxy are added to the murder supply equation.  It is 
statistically insignificant in models (5)-(8) which uses the Bayesian probabilities of 
execution for 1968-1976.  Overall, the mild influence of the changes in the schemes 
discovered here could be a reflection of the literature which shows that criminals are 
uninformed about punishment schemes (see Cameron, 1988 for a review).  
Economic Variables 
With the exception of model (5) real income has a negative sign and is significant in 
most cases in the short-run and long-run.  The negative sign is consistent with real 
income reflecting the opportunity cost of committing property crime.  The positive 
sign in model (5) is consistent with income proxying victim stock.  Labor force 
participation is only entered in models (1) and (5), where it is statistically insignificant 
in the short-run and long-run. In the long-run results unemployment is statistically 
significant with a positive sign in models (2) and (6), but is statistically insignificant 
in the other models.  In the short-run in most instances unemployment and 
unemployment with a one period lag have a negative sign. In the short-run 
unemployment is statistically significant in models (4), (7) and (8) and lagged 
unemployment is statistically significant in models (2)-(4) and (6)-(8).  
 
Other studies which have found unemployment to have a statistically significant 
negative effect on crime rates include Good et al (1986) and Britt (1994).  This   18
finding is inconsistent with the motivational perspective emphasised in the economics 
literature, but is consistent with the opportunity perspective stressed in the 
criminology literature.  The opportunity perspective sees crime as a function of the 
supply of suitable targets for victimization.  This perspective suggests that crimes will 
fall during times of high unemployment. The reason for this is that in times of 
economic downturn the circulation of people and the level of spending on new 
property is reduced.  As the unemployment rate rises more people will remain in their 
homes or close neighborhood providing more protection for their property, reducing 
the incidence of property crime, and curtailing the level of violent crime, most of 
which occurs outside the home (Cohen 1981, Cohen and Land 1987, Britt 1994). 
Demographic Variables and Other Crimes 
The proportion of the population aged 18 to 24 generally has the expected positive 
sign in both the short-run and long-run.  In the long-run it is statistically significant in 
model (3) and in the short-run it is statistically significant in models (2)-(4) and (6)-
(8).  In the long-run the variable measuring the proportion of the population that is 
non-white is statistically significant with an unexpected negative sign in model (5), 
but is otherwise insignificant.  In the short-run it is statistically insignificant in models 
(1) and (5), but is statistically significant with the expected sign in models (4) and (8).  
The divorce rate is statistically insignificant in both the short-run and the long-run. 
 
The proportion of fatalities that involve firearms is statistically insignificant in the 
long-run, but is statistically significant in the current period and with a one period lag 
in the short-run. The robbery rate is consistently statistically significant with the 
expected positive sign in models (2)-(4) and (6)-(8) in the long-run and short-run.  
With the exception of models (3) and (7) in the long-run, aggravated assault is also   19
statistically significant with the predicted positive sign in the short-run and long-run 
and aggravated assault with a one period lag is statistically significant in the short-run. 
 
V. PARAMETER STABILITY 
In this section we test the stability of the estimated coefficients for the homicide 
function, which is important given the small sample size and the debate in the existing 
literature over the stability of the homicide function.  Bowers and Pierce (1975), 
Passell and Taylor (1977) and Klein et al (1977) argue that the murder supply 
equation becomes unstable in the 1960s and that omitting the post-1960 data from the 
sample seriously weakens Ehrlich’s (1975) conclusion that capital punishment has a 
deterrent effect.  In more recent research Layson (1985) claims that the homicide 
function is stable, at least up until 1977. To test for parameter stability we use the 
Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) test.  According to Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), the short-
run dynamics are essential in testing for the stability of the long-run coefficients. For 
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   (6) 
In a similar way error correction models are developed for models (2)-(8). Once the 
ECMs have been estimated, Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) suggest applying the 
cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the CUSUM square 
(CUSUMSQ) tests proposed by Brown et al (1975) to assess the parameter constancy. 
The ECMs were estimated by ordinary least squares and the residuals were subjected 
to the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test.  Figure 1 plots the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ   20
statistics for models (1)-(4) and figure 2 plots the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ statistics 
for models (5)-(8). The results clearly indicate that the parameters are stable since the 
plot of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ statistics are confined within the 5 per cent 
critical bounds of parameter stability for each of the eight models. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1& 2 
-------------------------- 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The debate over whether capital punishment exerts a deterrent effect on the murder 
rate has raged for decades and is unlikely to subside.  The contribution of this paper to 
the debate is to use a cointegration and error correction framework.  Thus, for the first 
time we provide estimates of the long-run and short-run elasticities of the murder 
supply equation. We find, at best, mixed support for the deterrent effect. Our findings 
suggest that support for the deterrence hypothesis is sensitive to the inclusion of 
variables for the effect of guns and other crimes. Overall, we find that in the long-run 
real income and the conditional probability of receiving the death sentence are the 
main factors explaining variations in the homicide rate.  Meanwhile, in the short-run 
the aggravated assault rate and robbery rate are the most important determinants of 
variations in the homicide rate across all empirical specifications. 
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Table 1. Definition of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
lnMt  Log of murders and non-negligent manslaughters per 
100,000 population. 
t AGE ln   Log of the percentage of resident population aged 18-24. 
t Y ln   Log of real per capita personal disposable income. 
t PA ln   Log of the arrest clearance rate. 
t PE ln   Log of the probability of execution, conditional on 
receiving the death sentence. 
t PS ln   Log of the probability of receiving the death sentence, 
conditional on being apprehended. 
t U ln   Log of the unemployment rate. 
t L ln   Log of the labor force participation rate. 
t NW ln   Log of the percentage of resident population that is non-
white. 
t FA ln   Log of the proportion of fatalities that involve firearms. 
t D ln   Log of the divorce rate. 
t AA ln   Log of the aggravated assault rate. 
t R ln   Log of the robbery rate. 
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Table 2. Long-run results assuming there was one execution 1968-76 
Regressors  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
















































t L ln   4.6412 
(0.7463) 
- -  - 
t NW ln   -3.3512 
(-0.9922) 
- -  0.4000 
(1.4155) 
t FA ln   - -  0.2043 
(0.7765) 
- 
t D ln   - -0.0798 
(-0.2464) 
- - 





















() . FM   3.0624 4.5083 4.0303  5.0981 
Critical values 
k   90% 95%  99% 
  () 0 I   ( ) 1 I   ( ) 0 I   ( ) 1 I   () 0 I   () 1 I  
8  2.126 3.327 2.523  3.853  3.450  5.141 
9  2.085 3.317 2.464  3.833  3.359  5.106 
Notes: **(***) indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Critical values are calculated using stochastic simulations specific to the sample size 
based on 40,000 replications. k  is the number of regressors. 
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Table 3. Long-run results assuming Bayesian probabilities of execution 1968-76 
Regressors  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
















































t L ln   -6.5755 
(-1.2052) 
- -  0.0954 
(1.3809) 
t NW ln   -8.3620** 
(-2.0198) 
- -  0.3107 
(1.0723) 
t FA ln   - -  0.1405 
(0.3627) 
- 
t D ln   - -0.0995 
(-0.3260) 
- - 





















() . FM   5.4861 3.9582 4.1466  4.4263 
Critical values 
k   90% 95%  99% 
  () 0 I   ( ) 1 I   ( ) 0 I   ( ) 1 I   () 0 I   () 1 I  
8  2.126 3.327 2.523  3.853  3.450  5.141 
9  2.085 3.317 2.464  3.833  3.359  5.106 
Notes: **(***) indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Critical values are calculated using stochastic simulations specific to the sample size based on 
40,000 replications. k  is the number of regressors. 
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Table 4. Short-run results assuming there was one execution 1968-76 
Regressors   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
1 − t M ln ∆   - -  -0.1323 
(-1.6083) 
- 




























































t FA ln ∆   - -  0.5171*** 
(4.5681) 
- 
1 − t FA ln ∆   - -  0.4779*** 
(4.8166) 
- 


















t D ln ∆   - -0.0310 
(-0.2523) 
- - 
t NW ln ∆   0.2634 
(0.5935) 
- -  0.3934*** 
(2.9433) 
t L ln ∆   0.6123 
(0.9106) 
- - - 

















2 R   0.9516 0.9693 0.9923 0.9826 
() 1
2
RESET χ   0.3201 0.8481 0.7850 0.5186 
() 2
2
AUTO χ   0.0105 4.2337 3.2358 0.1792 
() 1
2
HETERO χ   1.4382 3.3431 0.0647 0.5124 
Notes: ^(*)**(***) indicates statistical significance at the 20%, 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. The critical value for  ( ) 1
2 χ  is 6.63 and for   is 9.21 at the  () 2
2 χ
1% significance level. 
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Table 5. Short-run results assuming Bayesian probabilities of execution 1968-76 
Regressors   Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 



































1 − t PA ln ∆   - -  0.6877*** 
(4.9116) 
- 








1 − t PS ln ∆   - -  -0.0089^ 
(-1.3113) 
- 






















t FA ln ∆   - -  0.5004*** 
(4.3140) 
- 
1 − t FA ln ∆   - -  0.5554*** 
(5.0662) 
- 


















1 − t R ln ∆   - -  -0.1694* 
(-1.9385) 
- 
t D ln ∆   - -0.0411 
(-0.3343) 
- - 
t NW ln ∆   -0.6213^ 
(-1.4826) 
- -  0.3615*** 
(2.7546) 
1 − t NW ln ∆   0.8964*** 
(3.1042) 
- - - 
t L ln ∆   0.2938 
(0.4010) 
- - - 
1 − t L ln ∆   3.0937*** 
(3.3021) 
- - - 















(1.5488)   35
2 R   0.7476 0.9699 0.9926 0.9825 
() 1
2
RESET χ   1.7455 0.6086 9.1774 0.1202 
() 2
2
AUTO χ   3.9560 4.9612 4.7332 0.3533 
() 1
2
HETERO χ   1.6544 3.5374 0.0199 0.6790 
Notes: ^(*)**(***) indicates statistical significance at the 20%, 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. The critical value for  ( ) 1
2 χ  is 6.63 and for   is 9.21 at the  () 2
2 χ
1% significance level.   36
Figure 1. 
Plot of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test for parameter stability models (1)-(4) 
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Figure 2. 
Plot of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test for parameter stability for models (5)-(8) 
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APPENDIX : SOURCE OF THE VARIABLES 
 
Variable Source 
Murder rate  FBI Uniform Crime Reports (various) 
Probability of 
apprehension 
FBI Uniform Crime Reports (various) 
Conditional probability of 
receiving a death sentence 
Capital Punishment in the United States (various) 
Conditional probability of 
execution 
Capital Punishment in the United States (various) 
The proportion of the 
resident population aged 
18-24 
Statistical Abstract of the United States (various) 
Real income  Kurian  (2001), Statistical Abstract of the United States 
(various) 
Unemployment rate  Statistical Abstract of the United States (various) 
The proportion of fatalities 
involving firearms 
FBI Uniform Crime Reports (various) 
Aggravated assault rate  FBI Uniform Crime Reports (various) 
Robbery rate  FBI Uniform Crime Reports (various) 
Divorce rate  Statistical Abstract of the United States (various) 
Labor force participation  Kurian (2001), Statistical Abstract of the United States 
(various) 
Proportion of the 
population that is non-
white. 
Statistical Abstract of the United States (various) 
Consumer Price Index  US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(1982-84 = 100) 
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NOTES 
                                                           
1 The unit root tests are available from the authors on request. 
2 Ehrlich (1977a) and Layson (1983, 1985) select a log linear form on the basis of a Box-Cox 
transformation.  This method is inapplicable to the model being used here. 
3 We also estimated models with just the deterrence variables as explanatory variables. When we 
arbitrarily assumed that there was one execution per year between 1968 and 1976 and when we used 
the Bayesian probabilities of execution between 1968 and 1976, the probability of apprehension and 
the conditional probability of execution were both significant with a negative sign, but the probability 
of receiving the death sentence was statistically insignificant.  The results are as follows: Assuming one 
execution per year between 1968 and 1976, lnPA = -1.5698** (-2.4911), lnPE = -0.1919*** (-3.3663), 
lnPS = -0.0720 (-0.5544), c = 7.9160*** (3.1379), Fm(.) = 5.1414.  Assuming the Bayesian 
probabilities of execution between 1968 and 1976, lnPA = -1.6381**** (-2.996), lnPE = -0.1611*** (-
5.2330), lnPS = -0.0121 (-0.1199), c = 8.7506*** (5.6515), Fm(.) = 7.5229. 